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Abstract
        After nearly two decades of freedom from evaluation, teachers in
Greece became the focus of a new evaluation system. In 1998, reformers
sought to raise the level of student performance by the regulation of
teacher performance through a top-down evaluation system administered
by the Greek Ministry of Education and Religous Affairs. The probable
effects of this evaluation system on teachers' professional roles and
development are analyzed.
Political and Historical Framework
        Greece represents a sound example of Cuban's (1995) argument that educational
reforms return again and again. This occurs, he argued, because "reforms have failed to
remove the problems they intended to solve". For over one hundred years, Greece has
been characterized by abortive, short-lived educational reforms, which have never been
implemented for more than a few years, and then were abandoned by the Ministry of
Education and Religious Affairs (MERA) for having failed to bridge rhetoric, design and
reality (Persianis, 1998). 
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        Following the restoration of democracy in 1974, and the entry of Greece into the
European Union in 1981, Andreas Papandreou's Socialist Government came to power.
His agenda included the designing of new reform proposals that would accelerate the
democratization as well as modernization of the Greek educational system. As a member
of the E.U., Greece places emphasis on reaching West European standards and
innovation. Greek schools, a highly centralized system under the jurisdiction of the
MERA, has been following French and German teaching methods "… regurgitation of
foreign pedagogical thought" (Curtis, 1994; Persianis, 1998). The country is divided into
fifteen administrative regions for education, each of which is subdivided into 240
districts (Peripheria), and is headed by evaluators-inspectors who monitor the
application of the curriculum. The educational programs are directed by provincial and
local authorities (Director and Employer of school Offices, one in each province) under
the managerial general policy guidelines of the MERA. The latter is composed of all
kinds of offices and institutions (Pedagogical Institute) that function according to central
authority regulations, which motivate, lead, and sponsor any policies and draft laws,
increasing the bureaucratization of schooling at all levels. 
        It is obviously difficult for those within educational bureaucracies to offer critical
policy analyses. In Europe, educational control is governmental (France) or quasi-
governmental (Great Britain), and it has been observed that educational policy is located
within the administrations of liberal or conservative parties. In Greece, even minor
changes depend on decisions made by the MERA, which reinforces the top-down
manipulation of policy decisions.
        It would not be misleading to say that there is no consensus on policy among the
major political parties, especially as it relates to the New Democracy and Panhellenic
Socialist Movement. Each party strives to promote its own ideological principles and
interests rather than to develop on-going goals through mass political organizations or
interest groups. The centralized nature of the administrative structure of the Greek
Educational System has been challenged through various attempts at "political
manipulation" by the governing party elite and the different interests groups (Gouvias,
1998). Moreover, each Minister claims to leave his stamp on any educational reform and
ensure his lasting reputation in the history of Greek education. An instance of this
appeared in June 1996, when the new Minister of Education, G.Arsenis (also a socialist)
launched the reform for "Ethniko Apolyterio" (National Leaving Certificate). He
promised to develop school curriculum, to provide in-service training for teachers, to
reestablish a whole hierarchy of evaluators whose mandate would be to monitor and
solve problems for the sake of teachers' improvement. The new reform was enacted by
the passage of legislation, and instituted a politically motivated program of Teacher
Evaluation. Unfortunately, the reform was announced "suddenly" without previous
warning in the summer season (vacation for schools), a typical strategy the Greek state
uses to secure legitimacy and reduce resistance. 
         Issues such as appointments, duties, inspection, evaluation and so forth, have
always been worked out in drafts of legislation. The Minister with the cooperation of
legislators and executives from the MERA wrote a reform bill, took it to the Parliament,
and asked his colleagues to make it law, in a manner that Wilson (1996) ironically calls
"ministerial responsibility." Greek Ministers actions reflect the attitude of centralized
bureaucracies, which attempt to "secure" their positions by law before negotiating
among practitioners and taxpayers. Instead, policy agendas must be socially negotiated
in a "National debate of education" among all factions- -the government, policy-makers,
and practitioners, whicht in a broad sense facilitate communication in solving problems
cooperatively (OECD, 1995). 
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        In the new era of educational reforms, no area has received more emphasis than the
quality of instruction and those employed to deliver it. Duke (1995) indicated that " the
key to educational improvement lies … in upgrading the quality of teachers"; central to
improving the quality of teachers is the teacher evaluation-inspection-supervision
process. The issue then becomes how to refine and change the content of the traditional
top-down flow of policy.
        In 1981, the Socialist Government passed Law 1340/82, which abolished the
influence of inspectors. Since then, teachers and school organizations have been free of
inspection. That Law of inspection remained in existence until recently, though with no
substantial role in enhancing teaching quality. All these years, teachers were being
appointed but were never formally evaluated. In this policy vacuum, teachers had the
unique opportunity to take advantage of their newly found liberties and promote the
professionalism of teaching; unfortunately, they did not avail themselves of this
opportunity. 
        On the other hand, the model of a more flexible evaluation was a great challenge
for Greece, which could not suddenly allow the whole educational system be in a
vacuum without internal restrictions and rules. Reformers sought to raise the level of
students' performance by the regulation of teacher performance. According to the
Government Gazette 27/02/98 and the application of Law n.2525/98, the new evaluation
policy underlies the top-down evaluation of all participants from researchers, policy
makers, evaluators, principals down to teachers. The results of these evaluations are to
go directly to the Central Offices of MERA. Before analyzing some noteworthy issues as
regards that evaluation, it is essential to discuss briefly the role of the government in
policy making.
The role of the government
        In Greece, the government is the principal source of funding. It sponsors any kind
of policy research through the Pedagogical Institute. Its agencies are appointed and not
elected, and are accountable to the public through the MERA. That situation creates the
situation of a "crisis of confidence" (OECD, 1995), because any kind of policy making
has the reputation of being fragmented and politicized, and as a result there is no trust
among the stakeholders, either in higher levels of the hierarchy or at the base of school
organizations. The social scientists perceive evaluation and authority as interconnected
(Stone, 1988) in a centralized authoritative educational system, where there are levels of
superiors (evaluators) and subordinates (evaluatees). 
        The former exercise authority based on the power of law and political skill rather
than on interpersonal relations, whereas the latter show compliance with the control
system. It is difficult for a single center to control the complex modern educational
system. It is for this reason that the centralized system has been criticized for lack of
imagination and its "top-heavy" structure in making decisions (OECD, 1995). The needs
of the government and of the practitioners cannot both be met.
        When one political party leaves office, it is replaced by another, which has different
views and priorities. Furthermore, "clientelism" pervades Greek education--the belief
that the criteria for appointment of teachers, evaluators and other employers or
employees are usually political following the well-known "rousfeti" (personal favors by
politicians to clients). Stone (1988) correctly argued that policy making tends to be
essentially political and involves a struggle over ideas, implying that the development of
policy has not followed a linear, rational model, but a model of differentiation. In this
model, experts and policy makers generate and bring knowledge into theories, which,
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later on, teachers use and practice. Political parties with strong and consistent ideology -
as in Greece - have stopped holding consultative meetings with teachers unions; they are
convinced that they know what to do without consulting teachers.
Why the restoration of evaluation is so important
        The current policies represent the first time that the MERA has paid so much
attention to evaluating-supervising instruction, teaching and especially teacher
appropriateness for school productivity. It is noteworthy that with the present policy
everybody is being evaluated--from principals to employers of educational offices,
directors, and inspectors-consultants. It is a top-down, multi- dimensional hierarchical
form of evaluation. However, teachers are the focal group who are being evaluated and
self-evaluated from multiple directions from higher levels (See Figure 1).
 
Figure 1. The Evaluation Pyramid
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         The only exception occurs at the top of the pyramid of evaluation, BPE (Body of
Permanent Evaluators), whose members will not be evaluated but are elected by the
MERA through public competition. The enabling legislation underlying this policy does
not mention the qualifications of the personnel who will occupy this level of the
evaluation system. At the highest level there is the Committee of Evaluation of School
Organizations (CESO) which "supervises, controls and coordinates the functions of BPE
and school consultants" (Law, 2525/98, article 5, FEK 188A' & Contemporary
Education, 1997). 
        Evaluation is a significant tool in controlling what is going on in schools and it
seeks to promote the self-development of teachers and the quality of their instruction.
The type of evaluation that the new law in Greece proposes is twofold. It includes both a
formative evaluation element, which is based on the "art of teaching" (Barber & Klein,
1984, pp.96-97) and emphasizes teacher performance and process of instruction, and a
summative evaluation element, which is grounded on both processes and products of
instruction. In fact, evaluation should empower teachers to use teaching methods that
will benefit students' learning. It is not suggested that teacher evaluation be implemented
in isolation, but rather in combination with other school improvement initiatives.
However, the question that arises is whether the criteria of evaluation reflect
international, national, regional and local needs of education. The general issues of the
new policy remain the same across the country, but seemingly they are flexible to adjust
to the local needs. 
        In Greece, the main contributors to evaluation theory and methodology have been
academics and educational researchers – like those in BPE and CESO—working under
the directive guidelines of the "political center." The same happens in a variety of
countries such as the United States of America, where evaluations are conducted by
specialized external evaluators (Wilcox, 1989). They produce standard questionnaires
that any level of employees dealing with quantitative outcomes must complete, instead
of conferring or advising teachers. In this respect, the new reform appears to be a "non
reform," inasmuch as it repeats and re-establishes anachronistic procedures, mainly those
that move the government to the position of the employer, and the teachers to the
position of employees in an atmosphere lacking mutual trust and collaboration.
        On a positive note, the new system is the first time that teachers have the chance to
evaluate themselves, though I am not convinced to what extent it will be a positive
experience nor how powerful will be the final reports sent to the higher levels of official
evaluation system. Undoubtedly, self-evaluation represents an innovation, since it affects
the local community and the teachers of each school, who will have, first, their own
rules in the policy of self-evaluation, to solve their own problems, and secondly, a
reasonable degree of autonomy (Law D2/1938/26- 02-98).
Who are the evaluators and what is their role?
        One of the most noteworthy features of the new hierarchical policy of evaluation is
the creation of two types of evaluator, the Internal (principals, directors, employers,
inspectors, and consultants) and the External (BPE, CESO). In Britain and the USA,
internal evaluation employs people who are not members of the evaluated institutions,
rather they are specialists with the mandate to check on the use of public funds and
insure that information be forwarded to the central government. They are experienced
professionals who make formal and informal visits to school organizations to interpret
(statistically) those organizations. Are these findings trustworthy, however? 
        It is worth mentioning that, paradoxically, in 1927, more than seventy years ago,
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Considering evaluation as a sort of "investigation," teachers can subjectively determine
their standards, wants, desires and present their findings, and offer feedback for
themselves and others. Because they are concerned about students and tasks of teaching
as well, they reflect upon leadership and accountability for instructional and personal
growth. Evaluators bring their own objective lists with questions that represent a
standardized measurement of teacher performance based on complex sets of explicit and
implicit standards and on teaching theory rather than on realities of classroom life. The
evaluator must be a person who uses "judgment as a tool, works to make sense of a
particular school" (Wilson, 1995). In opposition, even though supervisors should be the
instrument of decentralization, they should draw the connective chain from local to
central authority, and give the final statement regarding the quality of a school. 
        The new Greek evaluation system delegates authority to principals who, instead of
advising and organizing instruction, can now control and set realistic expectations in
achieving teaching objectives. Assuredly, that change is based on the lack of internal
evaluators who could be engaged full-time in observing school life. In the meantime, it
seems that the government intends to supplement the abolition of tenure by removing
incompetent teachers from classrooms. In regards to the new policy, principals assume
the authority to reject or alter teachers' goals, while evaluating teacher development
within a general infrastructure. 
         My argument is twofold. On the one hand, principals consider their buildings as
private territories regardless of teachers' opinion about their effectiveness to act as
educational leaders. The question remains: Do principals have the appropriate skills to
evaluate and supervise the teaching staff, even though they primarily identify themselves
with a political party? Furthermore, how could the validity of evaluation be secured
where there are personal disparities and differences? (Contemporary Education, 1997,
pp.150). Finally, how can the whole school organization function in harmony and be
productive within such an environment? Multiple evaluation presupposes more data and
more opportunities to corroborate findings.
Evaluation and Evaluators from Teachers' Perspective
        Teachers are of the opinion that "evaluation does not represent an external
consideration of school reality but an internal one by people who are involved" (OLME,
1997; Duke, 1995). They want to set their own priorities on what knowledge would be
most useful to their enterprises, and to strengthen a new professionalism, since teachers
themselves would contribute with their own criteria in evaluation process (with
emphasis on Self-Evaluation). Yet teachers require participating and planning for their
individual students at the level of the Center of Decision (MERA). Such ambitions
might change teachers' behavior and sense of accountability, and most important change
their image and opinion of evaluation coming from higher to lower levels. 
        Teachers need to have confidence in the impartiality and competence of evaluators
because the latter "are reluctant to use objective measures since they tend to face
teachers as inadequate" (Barber & Klein, 1984). Usually teachers feel overloaded with
both teaching responsibilities and episodes of evaluation-supervision that bring about
frustration, conflict and pressure which in turn increase teacher stress and burnout. If
evaluators adopt a new, more collegial, class-centered style rather than their
office/authority-based manner in assisting teachers to define their instructional intent,
autonomy will not be undermined and stress will be reduced (Goens & Knciejezyk,
1981). 
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        Moreover, teachers complain about the lack of cooperation with senior
administrative offices, which assume a different approach to education. They provide
practical considerations about how evaluation may be carried out, and stress the
importance for evaluators of living the reality of schooling every day. On the other hand,
the academic and research communities start out with policies that represent politically
attractive solutions. Duke (1995) claimed that "the initial impetus for changes has tended
to come from political and theoretical-based rather then professional school-based
demands and needs" (p.155). Politicians are so out of touch with the reality of schools
that sometimes they do not even know if their policies are bad or if their goals are too
abstract (Wilson, 1995). People whose work is crucial for the improvement of teaching
and learning increasingly become disengaged from the hard work of improving schools
because others outside their workplace decide what the policies are going to be. 
        By all accounts, teachers, individually and through their associations (unions) resist
policies they do not understand. When a new idea is introduced, resistance is the
common reaction. Teachers are familiar and comfortable with prior procedures, because
they know what to do. The unknown, unfamiliar can be frightening, since it will be
analytically investigated and reviewed. The more complex and uncertain the
policy-legitimate implications are, the more likely teachers will need information and
insights into what evaluation is doing and what it achieves. Conflicts can be identified
and discussed, while superiors and subordinates will have a wider range of options from
which to choose and will become wiser from the effort of choosing (OLME, 1997).
 
Conclusion
        Will Greece continue to appoint official evaluators based on political interests
rather than on the past performance or qualifications of candidates? Will the
inspector-supervisor-consultant-principal become an independent professional (school
person) or will he remain a governmental technocrat? Whatever the outcome, it is
imperative that the public know what schools are doing, and judge whether they are
doing it well. It is important for schools to be monitored, to reveal bad practitioners, bad
practice, and bad teachers. Furthermore, all the interest groups must show an increased
sense of accountability, and work in a collaborative environment with explicit standards.
        Government agencies are usually free from blame, while the achievement of a
policy is placed primarily on the backs of practitioners-teachers. The evaluation process
must be divided not in form, as occurs now, but in essence. Local policies should
promote and facilitate the diffusion of innovations and initiatives from all people who
are involved with education. We can no longer rely on bureaucratic mechanisms, on
regulations in law that hinder change or on complex standards that force narrow
definitions of effectiveness. Schools will change when we change our thinking about
them (Wilson, 1995).
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